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Abstract 
 
The websites of small, medium and large companies are a great competitive 
advantage in the business world. Companies invest a considerable amount of money to 
ensure they appear on top of the ranks when users seek for goods and services in search 
engines. On the other hand, websites open yet another door for an adversary to 
compromise the security of the organizations. 
The conventional network firewalls and intrusion prevention systems have 
limitations in protecting web applications because they operate at the network layer. The 
Web Application Firewall (WAF) is a solution that companies use to mitigate these 
limitations. The difference is in the ability to analyze the logic of the application layer. 
The WAF not only detects known attacks on the web application environment but can 
also detect and prevent new types of attacks through pattern analysis to traffic. 
This project aims to implement a redundant WAF architecture using the concept 
of diversity at the operating system (OS), web server and WAF technology. To evaluate 
the solution proposed we used vulnerabilities scanner tools to execute a set of security 
tests and a web load tests tool to measure the response times. 
The evaluation compared the resilience and impact on the performance of our 
architecture with several other configurations, with and without WAFs.  
 
Keywords: Web Application Security, Web Application Firewall, Reverse Proxy, 
Diversity, Load Balancing 
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Resumo 
 
Nos dias de hoje, as páginas de Internet das pequenas, médias e grandes empresas 
são uma grande vantagem competitiva no Mundo de negócios. As empresas investem 
consideravelmente para garantir que aparecem em primeiro lugar quando os utilizadores 
pesquisam por bens e serviços nos motares de busca.  
Por outro lado, os adversários usam este tipo de acesso para tentar comprometer a 
segurança das organizações. Os filtros de rede convencionais e detetores de intrusões 
apresentam limitações na proteção das aplicações web porque eles inspecionam ao nível 
da camada de rede.  
Os filtros para aplicações web (WAF) são uma solução que as empresas usam para 
mitigar estas limitações. A diferença está na habilidade de analisar a lógica da camada 
aplicacional. As WAFs não detetam somente ataques conhecidos no ambiente 
aplicacional web como também e quando devidamente configuradas podem detetar e 
prevenir novos tipos de ataques através da análise de padrões do tráfego. 
Neste projeto é implementada uma arquitetura de WAFs redundantes utilizando o 
conceito de diversidade a nível do sistema operativo, servidor web e da tecnologia WAF. 
Para avaliar o desempenho usamos ferramentas de análise de vulnerabilidades para 
executar testes de segurança e uma ferramenta de testes de carga para aplicações web para 
medir os tempos de resposta.  
A avaliação comparou resiliência da nossa arquitetura e o impacto no desempenho 
com outras configurações, com e sem WAFs. 
 
Palavras-chave: Segurança de Aplicações Web, Firewalls Aplicacionais Web, Servidor 
Intermediário, Diversidade, Balanceamento de Tráfego 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The use of web business applications is increasing in organizations. They are very 
easy to access through the ubiquitous web browser available on any computer and a great 
competitive advantage in the business world. This web access is also available for 
adversaries, which use it as an attack surface. According to a survey performed by 
Symantec, from 2012 to 2013, the proportion of scanned websites with vulnerabilities 
increased from 53 % to 77 % [24]. 
The conventional network firewalls have limitations protecting web applications 
because they were designed with two different approaches: stateless or stateful packet 
filtering. Stateless packet filtering firewalls analyze the network and transport headers of 
the inbound and outbound packets. In contrast, stateful packet firewalls track the packets 
connections by maintaining a state table. This table is used to determine if traffic is part 
of an established connection. 
The Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) also have restrictions when used to protect 
specific web applications. IPS solutions operate at the network layer and can detect 
attacks such as stealth port scans and attacks aimed at protocols like Secure Socket Shell 
(SSH). They allow or deny packets after comparing them to known attack signatures. IPS 
has no knowledge of the web application layer constructs, the data structure, and 
encoding. For this reason, IPSs fail to prevent many attacks, or generates false positives, 
depending on the security policies.  
The WAF is a solution to solve all of the above. It can completely analyze the logic 
of application layer and apply strict security checks on the decoded request content. It can 
detect known attacks and even new types of attacks by analyzing the pattern of the traffic 
[10]. 
This project aims to evaluate the contribution of redundant WAFs with a diversity 
approach regarding the OS, web server and the WAF technology. Redundancy is 
experimented as a tool to provide protection with both diversity and high availability 
capabilities for the web business applications. It is often argued that redundancy without 
diversity is useless against organized and systematic attack as most of the adversaries take 
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in consideration the predictable behavior of the target applications.  If the redundant nodes 
have the same characteristics, the same exploit might work on the entire architecture. 
With our solution, if the adversary succeeds to break one node, there is a low probability 
of compromising the remaining redundant nodes [3]. The concept of security through 
diversity is a topic of interest these days in the design of intrusion tolerance architectures.  
 
1.1 Motivation 
One of the organization's operational goals is to maximize the uptime of web 
business applications.  To achieve this objective one of the operation tasks is to protect 
these applications against the increased web threats. 
The presented work proposes a WAF architecture based on apache and nginx web 
servers which are the most popular web servers [23]. It is expected that most of the 
companies have a well-established experience with apache and nginx and can benefit 
from a smooth integration of this solution on their environments. 
This work will contribute to evaluate the implementation of redundant WAFs with 
a design diversity. Design diversity is the typical form of parallel redundancy for fault 
tolerance against design faults (either accidental or intentional): the multiple replicas of 
the system are handled by diverse software components [3]. This project uses two 
different WAFs, but the same strategy can be applied if the number of nodes increases. 
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1.2 Objectives 
The project has the following objectives: 
 Define a redundant WAF architecture composed by nodes with diverse OS, 
web server and WAF technology to reduce the probability of having 
common vulnerabilities 
 Configure the load balancing. When one of the servers is down for 
maintenance or unpredictable reason the web applications should 
still be available for the end users 
 Define rules to protect the development track solution from  web 
attacks 
 Generate a whitelist to avoid false positives 
 Test  and evaluate  the solution designed 
 Compare the resilience of our architecture with other configurations, 
with and without WAFs. 
 Compare the impact on the performance of our architecture with 
other configurations, with and without WAFs. 
 
1.3 Document Structure 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follow.  
Chapter 2 – Related Work. Reviews the problems identified by other authors and 
the solutions proposed by them. Then it presents the new goals this project wants to 
accomplish. Provides an overview of the top 10 web application security risks and 
describes the tools and concepts used in this work. 
Chapter 3 – Architecture Implementation. This chapter describes the installation 
and configuration of all architecture components such as servers, firewalls, load 
balancers, and software.  
Chapter 4 – Tests and Performance Evaluation. This part of the document presents 
the results and evaluation of the web security and web load stress tests executed in the 
testbed. 
Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Future Work. Summarizes what was done with this 
work. Describes open issues and directions for the continuation of this work. 
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Chapter 2 
Related work 
There are some works related to web server’s architectures which used the concept 
of redundancy, diversity, and rejuvenation in order to increase the system resilience to 
attacks [18] [19] [4].  
A generic architecture where redundant proxies filter client requests to a redundant 
group of diversified application servers was proposed in [18]. The authors implemented 
adaptive redundancy to improve performance. With this method of operation, the level of 
redundancy depends on the current alert level. When the attack density increases, the 
number of web servers that process each client request will also increase and consequently 
the performance will degrade. The case study was based on a travel agency web 
infrastructure. 
In [19], authors focused on the study of different intrusion-tolerant architectures for 
web servers (based on intelligent adaptive reconfiguration).  The objective is to help to 
build a more secure and resilient server system. 
In [4], the authors argue that the use of diversity and redundancy can make 
authentication systems resistant to unknown vulnerabilities. The redundancy is employed 
in a way that even if some are successfully attacked, the authentication system is not 
compromised. The diversity is introduced in authentication mechanisms so that they can 
resist attacks that exploit new vulnerabilities. 
 Similar to our work, Both authors in [18] and [19] propose solutions to protect a 
web application. The detection of those architectures is based on Snort Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) installed on proxies which have limitations in analyzing the 
application layer. In contrast, this project focuses on providing availability and better 
performance in the prevention of web attacks by implementing redundancy and diversity 
in WAF proxies.  
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2.1 Diversity 
The diversity approach in this architecture was applied on OS, web server, and 
WAF technology. 
 
2.1.1 Operating system  
The table below shows the vulnerabilities correlation between two different OS 
extracted from the study reported in [7].  CentOS, an equally popular Linux Distribution 
was not included in the study. However, it should be noted that CentOS built from much 
of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux codebase. The table shows that Ubuntu and Red Hat have 
one common vulnerability in system software making them good candidates for 
comparison in a diversity experiment. To build the table below the author’s correlated 
vulnerabilities that were shared by OS pairs in the period between 1994 and 2011. These 
vulnerabilities were collected from Nationality Vulnerability Database. 
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Table 1: Common Vulnerabilities on Isolated Thin Servers [7] 
Considering the minimal number of common vulnerabilities and the fact that they 
are both Linux distribution this work opted for using Ubuntu and CentOS. 
 
2.1.2 Web server 
The web servers addressed in our work are the most popular namely apache and 
nginx [23]. As of 17/11/2015, Nginx 1.9.5 has no reported vulnerabilities [23] which 
mean that there is a low probability of sharing the vulnerabilities reported in apache 2.4.7 
[23].  
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2.1.3 Web Application Firewall 
A WAF is an appliance, server plugin, or filter that applies a set of rules to a Hyper-
Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) conversation. The rules protect the web application from 
the most common attacks such as injection, broken authentication and session 
management, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), insecure direct object references, Cross-Site 
Request Forgery (CSRF) and invalidated redirects and forwards.  
Most of the open source WAF products are based on modsecurity and naxsi. The 
other reason of using these WAF solutions is the fact that modsecurity and naxsi integrate 
very well with apache and nginx respectively. Naxsi 0.54 and modsecurity 2.7.7 have no 
reported vulnerability on 17/11/2015 [23]. Consequently, an adversary will have more 
difficulties in compromising the web applications by exploiting a WAF vulnerability. It 
is expected that using other WAF solutions and combine them to have more diversified 
nodes will improve the web security. The number of diversified nodes will depend on the 
security requirements. 
 
Modsecurity 
Modsecurity is an open source and free WAF designed to integrate with apache and 
nginx. Functionalities offered by modsecurity falls roughly into four areas:  
 Parsing: the supported data formats (E.g.: XML) are backed by parsers that 
extract bits of data and record them for the use of the rules 
 Buffering: both request and response bodies are buffered. This allows 
modsecurity to sees complete requests before they are forwarded to the 
application for processing, and complete responses before they are delivered 
to clients 
 Logging: the log of transaction data can be customized. This allows to 
record complete HTTP traffic and which transaction are recorded. 
 Rule Engine: the HTTP traffic stream is inspected in real-time according to 
defined rules. It allows mitigating application vulnerabilities in a separate 
layer by applying block rules while developing a patch to fix the application 
code. This feature is known as virtual patching 
Modsecurity operates in self-contained or anomaly scoring detection mode. In a 
self-contained mode where if a rule triggers, it will execute any disruptive/logging actions 
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specified in the current rule. This approach offers better performance (lower 
latency/resources) because the first disruptive match will stop further processing. 
However, lower severity alerts are largely ignored. Alternatively, modsecurity could be 
configured in anomaly scoring detection mode which each matched rule will not block, 
but rather will increment anomaly scores using modsecurity's setvar action. If the current 
transactional score is above a defined threshold, the request will be denied.   
 
2.1.3.1 Naxsi 
Naxsi is an open-source and free WAF for nginx which provides security through 
a whitelist system, also known as “positive model firewalling”. Below are presented the 
most significant features: 
 Parsing: parses types of requests (E.g.: get, put and post) and body content-
types (E.g.: application/x-www)  
 Logging: records transaction using a standard format.   
 Rule Engine: inspects the HTTP traffic stream in real-time according to 
defined rules. The action to accomplish can be to block (production mode) 
or to record (learning mode). The learning mode helps the generation of 
whitelists to prevent blocks from occurring in production mode. This is one 
of the reasons to use naxsi as another WAF node 
 
Naxsi uses a file configuration with scores assigned to each rule. When the rule 
matches and a score exceeds a predicted threshold, the request is blocked. Figure 1 
presents the default scores configuration. 
 
Figure 1: Naxsi Score Rules 
LearningMode; 
#SecRulesEnabled; 
DeniedUrl "/RequestDenied"; 
## Check & Blocking Rules 
CheckRule "$SQL >= 8" BLOCK; 
CheckRule "$RFI >= 8" BLOCK; 
CheckRule "$TRAVERSAL >= 4" BLOCK; 
CheckRule "$EVADE >= 4" BLOCK; 
CheckRule "$XSS >= 8" BLOCK; 
CheckRule "$UPLOAD >= 8" BLOCK; 
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The table below compares the WAFs taking in consideration the naxsi and 
modsecurity features. 
 
Features Naxsi Modsecurity 
Parsing   
Buffering   
Logging   
Rule Engine   
Virtual Patching   
Learning mode   
Table 2: Naxsi and Modsecurity Comparison 
The notable main differences are in learning mode, buffering and virtual patching 
features. 
2.2 Web Attacks Classification 
The web attacks target is the application and focuses on the layer 7 of the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. This section describes the most common types of 
attacks relevant to web applications [16]. 
 
2.2.1 Injection 
Injection flaws, such as SQL and OS injection occur when untrusted and malicious 
data is sent to an interpreter as part of a query or command. The objective is to trick the 
interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper 
authorization. 
 
2.2.2 Broken Authentication and Session Management 
The complexity of designing an authentication and session management scheme 
that adequately protects credentials in all aspects of the web applications sometimes is an 
underestimate. Authentications and session management mechanisms may allow 
collecting passwords, keys or session tokens to assume user’s identity. 
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2.2.3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
In XSS attacks, the application accepts untrusted data and sends it to a web browser 
without proper validation or escaping. XSS allows the adversaries to execute scripts in 
the victim’s browser which can hijack user sessions, deface web sites, or redirect the user 
to malicious sites. 
 
2.2.4 Insecure Direct Object References 
A direct object reference occurs when application exposes a reference to an internal 
implementation object, such as a file, directory, or database key. The adversary exploits 
this reference to bypass authorization and access resources in the system directly. 
 
2.2.5 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
A CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim’s browser to send a forged HTTP request, 
including the victim’s session cookie and any other automatically included authentication 
information, to a vulnerable web application. This allows the attacker to force the victim’s 
browser to generate requests which the vulnerable application thinks are legitimate 
requests from the victim. 
 
2.2.6 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards 
Web applications frequently redirect and forward users to other pages and websites, 
and use untrusted data to determine the destination pages. Without proper validation, 
attackers can redirect victims to phishing or malware sites, or use forwards to access 
unauthorized pages. 
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2.3 Discussion 
Web-based solutions are being implemented for nearly every aspect of business 
operations. Web servers are also increasingly the primary source for malware delivery 
networks, hosting malware and putting users, resources and reputations at risk.  
According to web application vulnerability statistics from Positive Technologies 
[34] the most common vulnerability of 2013 namely Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), was 
second most common in 2014, affecting 70% of web applications analyzed. The ten most 
common vulnerabilities also include SQL Injection, a critical vulnerability detected in 
48% of the web resources studied as showed in the figure.  
 
 
Figure 2: Web Application Vulnerability Statistics 2014 
To protect the web application against these attacks some commercial and open 
source WAFs are available. This work focuses on open source solutions namely 
modsecurity and naxsi. 
It is common to use redundancy when designing the architecture with the objective 
to avoid a single point of failure. From a security perspective diversity, enables a more 
robust protection because the adversary might need to combine multiple techniques to 
compromise the target. As of 29th June 2016, there is no Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
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(COTS) product that implements diversity concept. This work contributes to fulfill this 
gap. 
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Chapter 3 
Architecture Implementation 
3.1 Architecture 
The implementation consisted of installation and configuration of all architecture 
components such as servers, firewalls, load balancers, and software. This project was 
developed using the Antex international web infrastructure1. The original web 
architecture depicted in figure 1: 
 
Internet
UTM
Web
Users Web
Web
DMZ 
Network
Servers 
Network
Reverse 
Proxy
 
Figure 3: Antex International Current Web Architecture 
                                                
1 https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com  
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In this architecture, a reverse proxy is located behind a Unified Threat Management 
(UTM) and in front of web servers. A UTM include functions such as network firewalling 
and intrusion detection and prevention. All incoming requests are delivered to the reverse 
proxy which then forwards them to the back end web servers on behalf of the originating 
client application. In the current architecture, the traffic is inspected for malicious content 
by the IPS. 
The new architecture was designed taking into consideration the original web 
infrastructure of the Antex International organization. Figure 3 illustrates the architecture 
designed in the scope of this work.  
 
Internet
UTM
Web
Users Web
Web
DMZ 
Network
Servers 
Network
Modsecurity
Naxsi
Level 1 Level 2
Naxsi
Modsecurity
 
Figure 4: Antex International Proposed Web Architecture 
 
All the components are deployed between a Unified Threat Management (UTM) 
and the web servers. All HTTP traffic is flowing through the WAFs. Incoming requests 
are addressed to the WAFs, who are responsible for forwarding them to the back-end web 
servers on behalf of the originating client. The UTM equally plays the role of load-
balancer, distributing the load by the two “Level 1” WAFs. Each of the “Level 1” WAFs 
is connected to a single “Level 2” WAF of the opposing model, thus enforcing all the 
requests to be evaluated by the two WAF models. The “Level 2” WAFs send each of the 
web requests to be processed by the web application. 
It should be noted that WAFs use the reverse proxy mode, what permits to terminate 
connections if an attack is detected. As will be discussed in the tests and performance 
evaluation section, this option has the drawback of notably increasing latency.  
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3.2 Configuration 
This section describes the configuration performed on the architecture components. 
  
3.2.1 Hardware 
The servers, firewalls and load balancer are virtualized.  For the test environment, 
the virtual machines were created on the same physical host. For production mode, we 
recommend installing the virtual machines in different physical hosts to avoid the creation 
of a single point of failure. VirtualBox was selected as hypervisor because it is the only 
virtualization solution available for Linux and Windows, simplifying the migration 
between these operating systems. 
 
3.2.2 Server 
Each WAF is run on a virtual server emulating an Intel Xeon 2.4GHz with 2 GB of 
RAM and a 30 GB hard drive.  
Table 3 lists the software installed on the servers which was the last stable release 
of each package as of 30/11/2016. 
 
Server OS Web server WAF 
Naxsi01 Centos 7.1.1503 Nginx 1.9.5 Naxsi 0.54 
Naxsi02 Centos 7.1.1503 Nginx 1.9.5 Naxsi 0.54 
Modsecurity01 Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS Apache 2.4.7  ModSecurity 2.7.7  
Modsecurity02 Ubuntu 14.04.3 LTS Apache 2.4.7  ModSecurity 2.7.7  
Table 3: Software 
The operating system was installed with the LVM (Logical Volume Manager) 
option enabled to facilitate the partitions dimensioning. The var directories  were created 
in the independent partition to avoid OS failures resulting from hard drive space 
exhaustion. This is expected as WAFs consume a considerable amount of disk space 
writing detection logs. 
The business application used for this test bed was Redmine. Redmine is an open 
source project management web application, written using the Ruby on Rails framework. 
We created a clone of the current production virtual machine used for software 
development tasks. 
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3.2.3 Nginx - Naxsi 
Naxsi was added as a module when precompiling nginx during the installation 
process.  The command nginx –V shows the version and configuration options: 
 
Figure 5: Nginx Installation Information 
Naxsi configuration includes the nasxi core rules [9] and complemented with doxi 
rules [25]. The nasxi core rules [9] included in this main configuration file are the default 
rules to prevent SQL injections, remote file inclusion, directory traversal, cross-site 
scripting, evasion and file uploads attacks. The doxi rules [24] are available as an 
independent Github repository and aim to provide additional protection against this kind 
of attacks.  
We added to naxsi score configuration the following entries for doxi rules: CheckRule 
"$UWA >= 8" BLOCK and CheckRule "$ATTACK >= 8" BLOCK. These scores are 
included in the default configuration.  
 
$ nginx -V 
nginx version: nginx/1.9.5 
built by gcc 4.8.3 20140911 (Red Hat 4.8.3-9) (GCC) 
built with OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013 
TLS SNI support enabled 
configure arguments: --user=root --group=root --
prefix=/usr/share/nginx --sbin-path=/usr/sbin/nginx --conf-
path=/etc/nginx/nginx.conf --error-log-path=/var/log/nginx/error.log 
--http-log-path=/var/log/nginx/access.log --http-client-body-temp-
path=/var/lib/nginx/tmp/client_body --http-proxy-temp-
path=/var/lib/nginx/tmp/proxy --http-fastcgi-temp-
path=/var/lib/nginx/tmp/fastcgi --pid-path=/var/run/nginx.pid --
lock-path=/var/lock/subsys/nginx --with-http_ssl_module --with-
http_realip_module --with-http_addition_module --with-
http_sub_module --with-http_dav_module --with-http_flv_module --
with-http_gzip_static_module --with-http_stub_status_module --with-
http_perl_module --with-ld-opt=-Wl,-E --with-http_geoip_module --
add-module=../naxsi-master/naxsi_src 
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Naxsi was initially configured in “LearningMode”. With this setup, the malicious 
requests are registered in the error log file and not blocked. An example of the whitelist 
produced by learning mode is presented in Appendix A.  
Figure 5 shows an example of a false positive. This request is detected as RFI attack 
because it includes the string https in the middle of the URL and the score matches the 
value 8 specified in the RFI /etc/nginx/naxsi.rules file.  
 
Figure 6: False Positive - RFI 
During the creation of the whitelist, we had to make sure that only legitimate traffic 
is presented to the nginx. This was accomplished by using the firewall to restrict access 
to the application from the IP address producing the legitimate learning traffic.  
The nxapi tool which is designed to import the naxsi events from this whitelist 
logfile into an elastic search database: 
If the data is added correctly, the nxtool will be able to generate statistics regarding 
the client as well as the URLs accessed. An example of these statistics is depicted in figure 
6:  
2016/02/18 12:41:22 [error] 2988#0: *1 NAXSI_FMT: 
ip=46.20.43.122&server=moldtrack.ai-
emea.com&uri=/login&learning=0&vers=0.54&total_processed=1&total_blo
cked=1&block=1&cscore0=$RFI&score0=8&zone0=ARGS&id0=1101&var_name0=b
ack_url, client: 46.20.43.122, server: moldtrack.ai-emea.com, 
request: "GET /login?back_url=https%3A%2F%2Fmoldtrack.ai-emea.com%2F 
HTTP/1.1", host: "moldtrack.ai-emea.com" 
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Figure 7: Nxapi – Display Database Content 
 
The configuration including the default, doxi and whitelist rules was tested using 
penetration-testing tools. The results of these experiments are described in the tests and 
performance evaluation section.  
 
3.2.4 Apache – Modsecurity 
Modsecurity was installed from Ubuntu repository. 
Modsecurity was enabled as an apache2 module and the OWASP ModSecurity 
Core Rule Sets (CRS) [13] were included in apache main configuration file.  
The OWASP ModSecurity CRS provides protections for the following attack/threat 
categories: 
 HTTP protection: detecting violations of the HTTP protocol and a 
locally defined usage policy 
 Real-time blacklist lookups: which utilizes 3rd party IP reputation 
 HTTP denial of service protections: defense against HTTP flooding 
and slow HTTP DoS attacks 
 Common web attacks protection: detecting common web application 
security attacks such as SQL injections, XSS and CSRF 
$./nxtool.py -c nxapi.json –x 
# size :1000 
# Whitelist(ing) ratio : 
# false 49.78 % (total:452/908) 
# Top servers : 
# moldtrack.ai-emea.com 100.0 % (total:452/452) 
# Top URI(s) : 
# /projects 14.16 % (total:64/452) 
# /projects/show/antex-infra 14.16 % (total:64/452) 
# /issues/show/1219 7.08 % (total:32/452) 
# /projects/antex-infra/issues 7.08 % (total:32/452) 
# /projects/show/hrpm-invoicet 7.08 % (total:32/452) 
# /issues/edit/1219 4.42 % (total:20/452) 
# / 3.54 % (total:16/452) 
# /images/ticket_note.png 3.54 % (total:16/452) 
# /my/account 3.54 % (total:16/452) 
# /my/page 3.54 % (total:16/452) 
# /projects/activity/antex-infra 3.54 % (total:16/452) 
# Top Zone(s) : 
# HEADERS 99.12 % (total:448/452) 
# BODY 0.88 % (total:4/452) 
# Top Peer(s) : 
# 46.20.43.122 100.0 % (total:452/452) 
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 Automation detection: detecting bots, crawlers, scanners and another 
surface malicious activity 
 Integration with antivirus scanning for file uploads: detects malicious 
files uploaded through the web application 
 Tracking sensitive data: tracks credit card usage and blocks leakages 
 Trojan protection: detecting access to trojans horses 
 Identification of application defects: alerts on application 
misconfigurations 
 Error detection and hiding: disguising error messages sent by the 
server 
Modsecurity was configured in a self-contained mode. The self-contained mode is 
in contrast with naxsi mode as the latter follows a scheme where each matched rule adds 
to the request score and requests are dropped if their score is above a predefined threshold. 
In addition, naxsi redirects dropped requests to “RequestDenied” page while modsecurity 
returns a page with “Forbidden” message (code 403).  
Finally, modsecurity was configured to allow some content types normally to be 
uploaded by the users to redmine and to ignore some rules that aim to prevent attacks out 
of the scope of this project namely cold fusion and LDAP injection. 
 
3.2.5 Load balancer 
The load balancer service is integrated into the UTM appliance. We used one load 
balancer to distribute HTTP traffic between the level 1 WAFs (naxsi and modsecurity). 
A monitor for HTTP, which constantly send requests to the nodes to check the 
availability was defined. A node is considered alive when the response code is 200 OK. 
The monitor configuration was applied in two pools, one for HTTP and the second 
for HTTPS service to check the nodes availability. Each pool is composed of the level l 
WAFs with IP address 10.0.1.27 and 10.0.1.50.  
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Figure 8: Load Balancer Pools 
 
To ensure service availability in case of  “Level 2” WAF failures, ”Level 1'” servers 
voluntarily terminate their HTTP server if they find their counterpart to be unavailable. 
Monitoring is performed by sending HTTP requests every 30s to the level 2 WAFs with 
IP 10.0.1.49 and 10.0.1.28 using the monit tool [32]. 
Virtual servers were configured and assigned the pools previous created for HTTP 
and HTTPS service. The public IP address for each virtual server is 46.20.43.123 which 
is a redmine application DNS record. 
 
 
Figure 9: Load Balancer Virtual Servers 
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Chapter 4 
Tests and Performance Evaluation 
The performance of the WAF solution was evaluated and compared using a testbed 
that permits to assess naxsi and modsecurity separately and compose them in the target 
architecture. The evaluation focused on the measure the security effectiveness, 
throughput, and stability, reliability and usability. The security effectiveness represents 
the capability to detect specific attacks. Throughput measured the transactions speed in 
the current and proposed architecture to compare the overhead caused by naxsi and 
modsecurity. The stability and reliability measure the WAF's capability to distinguish 
legitimate from malicious traffic.   
 
4.1 Security Effectiveness 
To validate and verify the effectiveness of security controls provided with the 
redundant WAF architecture composed by naxsi and modsecurity we used security testing 
tools for web applications. In particular the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP), Open 
Vulnerability Assessment System (OpenVAS) and burp suite.  
We also evaluated security by executing customized security tests taking in 
consideration the vulnerabilities reported in Redmine Security Advisories [26] until 
12/03/2016. 
 
4.1.1 Security Testing Tools 
 
The OWASP ZAP is a popular free security tool. It can help to automatically find 
security vulnerabilities in web applications or can be used for manual security testing. 
OWASP is a worldwide not-for-profit charitable organization focused on improving the 
security of software that counts with a number of relevant supporters such as Google and 
Microsoft. The OWASP 10 security vulnerabilities list [15] is a reference for many 
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security testing tools like Qualys Guard[17], Acunetix[1] and Nexpose[21]. However, all 
of them do not have a free edition. For this reason, we did not use in this project. 
In addition to OWASP, a free edition of burp suite provided by Portwigger Ltd was 
used.  This platform supports the entire security testing process, from initial mapping and 
analysis of an application's attack surface to finding and exploiting security 
vulnerabilities. 
Kindly, OpenVAS is a free framework of several services and tools offering a 
vulnerability scanning and vulnerability management solution. To scan web applications, 
it integrates with nikto [26] and w3af [26] tools. OpenVAS creates a comprehensive way 
to explore and combine these free tools. 
 
4.1.2 Test without WAF protection 
Using OWASP ZAP we run a test against the redmine application. To configure a 
redmine user authentication we used the OWASP ZAP proxy feature. The results 
obtained are presented below.  
   
Risk Level Number of Alerts 
High 1 
Medium 0 
Low 3 
Table 4: Test without WAF protection 
Was found one high-risk level vulnerabilities, which is XSS (persistent). The 
customized tests section explains how to exploit this vulnerability in the absence of WAF 
protection.  
The low-level vulnerabilities are incomplete or no cache-control and pragma HTTP 
header set (settings), the absence of anti-CSRF Tokens and the allowance of password 
autocomplete in the browser. 
The incomplete or no cache-control and pragma HTTP header set checks if cache-
control HTTP header is set with no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, private and that the 
pragma HTTP header is set with no-cache. If any of them is missing, it is considered 
incomplete and thus triggers the alert. In this case, the response from the server has two 
cache-control headers as we can see in the following response  from the HTTP server: 
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Figure 10: Cache-control Headers 
This problem was reported to OWASP ZAP support team because the server was 
configured with the correct parameters on the apache main configuration file. Our report 
raise issue on GitHub [28] so the cache control scanner can accommodate multiple 
headers. 
The absence of anti-CSRF Tokens means that the scanner did not find known anti-
CSRF token. This redmine deployment does not implement CSRF token and the scanner 
detected it. 
The password autocomplete in browser vulnerability means that the autocomplete 
attribute is not disabled in the redmine form “_form.rhtml”. Consequently, the form 
Passwords may be stored in browsers and retrieved.  
The OpenVAS framework test did not find any web vulnerability. It founds some 
low operating system vulnerabilities, which is out of the scope of this project. Compared 
with OpenVAS, the OWASP ZAP proxy features improves the detection of 
vulnerabilities such as XSS and CSRF because of the ability to collect data inserted in 
redmine pages. 
  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Date: Fri, 05 Feb 2016 12:01:08 GMT 
Server: Apache/2.2.8 (Ubuntu) mod_ssl/2.2.8 OpenSSL/0.9.8g 
Phusion_Passenger/2.2.5 
X-Powered-By: Phusion Passenger (mod_rails/mod_rack) 2.2.5 
X-Runtime: 0.01472 
ETag: "e09e73360faa05bcde95af220303dd9d" 
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0, must-revalidate 
Set-Cookie: _session_id=d06d292cc85d910ebb59f7faf956d06a; path=/; 
HttpOnly; secure 
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 
Content-Length: 3535 
Status: 200 OK 
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block 
Cache-Control: max-age=31536000, private, no-cache, no-store, must-
revalidate 
Pragma: no-cache 
Expires: 0 
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 
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4.1.3 Test with naxsi protection 
Using OWASP ZAP we executed an authenticated test against the redmine 
application, obtaining the results presented below. 
 
Risk Level Number of Alerts 
High 0 
Medium 0 
Low 3 
Table 5: Test with Naxsi protection 
This test identified three vulnerabilities equally reported without naxsi: password 
autocompletes in the browser, the absence of anti-CSRF tokens and incomplete or no 
cache-control and pragma HTTP header. The results show significant improvements in 
the web application security by implementing a naxsi WAF given that the high-risk alerts 
have been eliminated. The naxsi rules do not include the detection and prevention of 
CSRF and consequently, cannot protect the web application against this type of attack. 
The incomplete or no cache-control and pragma HTTP header refers to redmine default 
error pages returned as a response to unexpected requests. An important aspect of secure 
application development is to prevent error messages that give an attacker great insight 
into the inner workings of an application. It is important to assure the application fails 
safely under all possible error conditions, expected and unexpected.  
The OpenVAS scan did not report any web vulnerability. It founds some low 
operating system vulnerabilities, which are out of the scope of this project. 
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4.1.4 Test with modsecurity protection 
To be able to scan the application OWASP ZAP requires disabling modsecurity 
configuration rules with id 960015 and 960021.  The first rule checks to see if an accepted 
header is present. The second rule checks if an accepted header exists, but is empty. The 
vulnerabilities found by OWASP when used modsecurity were: 
 
Risk Level Number of Alerts 
High 0 
Medium 0 
Low 2 
Table 6:Test with Modsecurity Protection 
The scan results show two low-level vulnerabilities namely: password 
autocompletes in the browser and the absence of anti-CSRF tokens. 
 The password autocomplete in browser vulnerability was equally detected with 
naxsi WAF and the solution is the same as explained. 
Modsecurity has a rule for CSRF which is part of the optional rules set. We enabled 
this rule to protect a critical location (/admin). When entering at this location, a CSRF 
Token is assigned to the request. However, modsecurity generates the warning below: 
 
Figure 11: Modsecurity CSRF ATTACK Log 
The ideal is that the CSRF token should come from the application and not the WAF. 
However, modsecurity does have a method of inserting them, which is an interesting 
proof of concept. The modsecurity rule 981145 uses content injection to inject a bit of 
javascript to set the CSRF token on any URLs or forms for any HTML pages 
requested and when the subsequent request comes in after rule 981144 compares the 
CSRF Token and rejects any requests without a valid token.  
[Wed May 11 23:51:11.367462 2016] [:error] [pid 987:tid 
140478968223488] [client 46.20.43.122] ModSecurity: Warning. Match 
of "streq %{SESSION.CSRF_TOKEN}" against "ARGS:CSRF_TOKEN" required. 
[file 
"/usr/local/apache/conf/crs/activated_rules/modsecurity_crs_43_csrf_
protection.conf"] [line "34"] [id "981144"] [msg "CSRF Attack 
Detected - Invalid Token."] [hostname "moldtrack.ai-emea.com"] [uri 
"/admin"] [unique_id "VzOpTwoAARwAAAPbjP4AAAAD"] 
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As before, the OpenVAS scan did not report any web vulnerability. It founds some 
low operating system vulnerabilities, which are out of the scope of this project. 
 
4.1.5 Test with Naxsi and Modsecurity Composition 
The sequence composition  considered both with naxsi in front of modsecurity and 
vice-versa. We verified that the results were the same in both implementations and are 
presented below.  
Using OWASP ZAP we executed an authenticated test against the redmine 
application. The results are presented below. 
   
Risk Level Number of Alerts 
High 0 
Medium 0 
Low 2 
Table 7:Test with Naxsi and Modsecurity Composition 
 The results show two low-level vulnerabilities: password autocomplete in the 
browser and the absence of anti-CSRF tokens. This was predictable because the 
vulnerability scanner previously found this vulnerability in application code when testing 
the protection provided by naxsi and modsecurity separately.  
Until now, these results suggest that there is no considerable security improvement 
when WAFs are combined. It should be noted that the Level 1 WAF could hide the 
presence of Level 2 WAF. This creates additional challenges to the adversary that may 
show beneficial in customized attacks scenarios. 
The OpenVAS scan did not report any web vulnerability. It founds some low 
operating system vulnerabilities, which are out of the scope of this project. 
The next step is to evaluate the solution proposed by executing customized 
attacks. 
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4.1.6 Customized tests 
The customized tests were designed taking into consideration the list of security 
vulnerabilities from redmine security advisories [27] as of 15/03/2016.  
The redmine security advisories contained some vulnerabilities not included in 
these tests:  
 Data disclosure in atom feed 
 Potential changeset message disclosure in issues API 
 Data disclosure on the time logging form 
 Potential data leak (project names) in the invalid form authenticity token 
error screen 
 Ruby on Rails vulnerability (announcement) 
 Mass-assignment vulnerability that would allow an attacker to bypass part 
of the security checks.  
For these vulnerabilities, the most appropriate solution would be to apply the 
patches that have been made available, upgrade packages or recommended 
configurations. Some of the vulnerabilities related do API does not affect the redmine 
application because are not in use. 
The table below shows the test results for each vulnerability considered for 
customized tests: 
28 
 
Severity Details Without WAF Naxsi Modsecurity Naxsi+Modsecurity 
Moderate 
Open Redirect 
vulnerability 
If we execute the following URL:  
https://moldtrack.ai-
emea.com/login?back_url=@fakemoldtrack.com 
the user is redirected to fakemoldtrack.com. 
This attack is 
blocked. 
This attack is not 
blocked. 
This attack is 
blocked. 
High 
Persistent XSS 
vulnerability 
In project settings ->version. The version field 
does not make input validation. If we insert a 
script like <script>alert("XSS")</script> in the 
name field, when the user clicks on roadmap the 
browser will execute the script inserted on the 
name. 
This attack is 
blocked. 
This attack is 
blocked. 
This attack is 
blocked. 
High 
Vulnerability that 
would allow an 
attacker to bypass the 
CSRF protection 
Using the HTML code (appendix B) it is possible 
to create a user with admin privileges. The 
session must be from a user with permissions to 
create users. 
This attack is not 
blocked. 
This attack is not 
blocked. 
This attack is not 
blocked. 
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From OWASP ZAP and customized tests, we see that combination of both WAF’s 
improves the protection of redmine application over the possible attacks.  The table below 
depicts a comparison between the number of vulnerabilities when not using a WAF 
protection, using naxsi or modsecurity separately and combining both WAFs.  
 
 Test No WAF Naxsi modsecurity Naxsi+Modsecurity 
OWASP ZAP 4 3 2 2 
Customized 3 1 2 1 
Distinct 5 3 3 2 
Table 8: Vulnerabilities Identified in OWASP ZAP and Customized Tests 
The last row counts the number of distinct vulnerabilities after remaining those that 
were found in both experiments. 
The solution proposed has less number of vulnerabilities because it takes the 
benefits from naxsi and modsecurity. It is expected that naxsi and modsecurity 
capabilities will be improved to accommodate new threats and needs. This updates may 
happen in different periods and approaches considering that distinct developers perform 
it. Consequently, our solution will take advantage of the newly developed features from 
both naxsi and modsecurity. 
 
4.1 Performance 
The next step for the comparison analysis evaluates the throughput for each of the 
test cases. To collect data for the performance analysis we used the visual studio web 
performance and load tests tool. It is a product from Microsoft, which helps to determine 
how well a software responds to various levels of usage. It allows a simulation of multiple 
users opening simultaneous connections to a server and making multiple HTTP requests.  
The objective is to determine how much overhead the WAF places in the system.  
We measured the times for the following applications pages: open the webpage, 
login, list projects, browse a specific project, create a new issue in a specific project with 
a document upload, download a file from the specific project, show my page and use the 
search option. 
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The page loading times were measured in six different configurations with caching 
disabled in the proxies:  
 Without a WAF 
 Naxsi  
 Modsecurity 
 Naxsi and modsecurity in sequence 
 Testbed 
 Testbed under attack. To evaluate this scenario, we execute the OWSAP 
ZAP simultaneous with the visual studio web performance and load tests 
tool 
Each of the tests duration was 600s and simulated 25 concurrent users.  
The first step of the performance test was the definition of the requests to be 
performed by using the visual studio record option. This is a plugin, which records the 
browser requests and captures their parameters. To make sure that the requests executed 
successfully by the application we monitor the redmine’ production log file: 
 
Figure 12: Redmine Log 
From the production log excerpt above, we can see an example of a request to 
download a file “Record_August.pdf” which was executed successfully (response code 
“200”). 
The tests for each scenario returned the following data:  
 Page: the name of the page used in the test 
 Total: the total number of requests made for each page. 
 Avg: the average page response time 
 Min.: the minimum page response time 
 Median: the median page response time 
$ tail -f production.log 
 
Processing AttachmentsController#show (for 46.20.43.122 at 2016-03-07 
17:10:14) [GET] 
  Session ID: cf4eb64fa36df6fce81928082b13157c 
  Parameters: {"action"=>"show", "id"=>"432", 
"controller"=>"attachments", "filename"=>"Report_August.pdf"} 
Completed in 0.04694 (21 reqs/sec) | Rendering: 0.00040 (0%) | DB: 
0.04099 (87%) | 200 OK [https://moldtrack.ai-
emea.com/attachments/432/Report_August.pdf] 
Streaming file 
/var/www/railsapp/files/140925095819_Report_August.pdf 
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 99 %: the 99th percentile for the response time. This indicates that 99% of 
the pages responded faster than this value 
 Max.: the maximum page response time 
 Std. Dev.: the standard deviation of the pages response times 
 
The table below depicts the metrics above when no WAF was used. All values are 
in seconds. 
 
 Page Total  Avg. Min. Median 99% Max. Std. Dev. 
https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com/ 100 1.930 0.031 0.200 9.450 9.450 3.110 
/attachments/432/Report_August.pdf 75 0.410 0.034 0.055 4.000 4.000 0.930 
/issues/show/1219 174 3.970 0.700 3.610 12.500 12.800 2.730 
/login {POST} 99 1.260 - - 17.500 17.500 3.210 
/my/page 75 0.720 0.081 0.260 4.950 4.950 1.040 
/projects 75 0.260 0.046 0.089 4.370 4.370 0.670 
/projects/activity/antex-infra 79 0.560 0.120 0.500 1.690 1.690 0.320 
/projects/antex-infra/documents 78 0.120 0.035 0.067 0.750 0.750 0.140 
/projects/antex-infra/issues 154 0.760 0.160 0.450 6.040 6.570 1.050 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new 
{GET} 177 0.840 0.060 0.170 8.420 11.000 1.890 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new 
{POST} 80 0.940 0.230 0.580 4.310 4.310 0.860 
/projects/settings/antex-infra 78 0.210 0.067 0.140 1.100 1.100 0.210 
/projects/show/antex-infra 154 0.250 0.046 0.120 3.320 5.830 0.600 
/search/index/antex-infra 75 0.390 0.057 0.280 4.500 4.500 0.560 
Table 9: Response Time without WAF 
The Min. and Median metrics were not possible to calculate accurately for the login 
page in all scenarios, even after repeatedly execute the measurement. This issue was 
found for all performance tests as we can see in remain results.  
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The next table depicts the metrics obtained when a naxsi WAF was deployed 
between the HTTPS client and the application. 
 
 Page Total  Avg. Min. Median 99% Max. Std. Dev. 
https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com/ 99 2.470 0.037 0.170 10.600 10.600 3.810 
/attachments/432/Report_August.pdf 74 0.420 0.045 0.072 4.750 4.750 0.960 
/issues/show/1219 167 4.880 0.810 3.910 19.900 22.500 4.070 
/login {POST} 96 1.180 - - 8.240 8.240 2.420 
/my/page 75 0.440 0.120 0.300 2.750 2.750 0.490 
/projects 75 0.410 0.095 0.190 4.850 4.850 0.730 
/projects/activity/antex-infra 78 1.880 0.680 1.660 4.090 4.090 0.870 
/projects/antex-infra/documents 78 0.240 0.094 0.190 1.580 1.580 0.220 
/projects/antex-infra/issues 152 1.010 0.230 0.760 5.800 6.770 0.980 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new 
{GET} 169 0.980 0.150 0.330 15.700 16.400 2.560 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new 
{POST} 82 1.050 0.330 0.770 5.630 5.630 0.810 
/projects/settings/antex-infra 78 0.490 0.120 0.350 1.830 1.83 0.380 
/projects/show/antex-infra 153 0.450 0.091 0.220 5.610 7.49 0.940 
/search/index/antex-infra 74 0.570 0.120 0.370 4.650 4.65 0.620 
Table 10: Response Time with Naxsi 
The table below shows the metrics for the modsecurity configuration. 
  
 Page Total  Avg. Min. Median 99% Max. Std. Dev. 
https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com/ 99 2.230 0.043 0.150 9.180 9.180 3.550 
/attachments/432/Report_August.pdf 74 0.590 0.047 0.100 5.580 5.580 1.240 
/issues/show/1219 168 4.480 0.810 4.070 12.900 18.300 3.070 
/login {POST} 95 1.780 - - 19.500 19.500 4.200 
/my/page 75 0.470 0.120 0.310 4.440 4.440 0.630 
/projects 75 0.280 0.093 0.170 2.280 2.280 0.310 
/projects/activity/antex-infra 77 3.200 0.810 3.110 7.420 7.420 1.670 
/projects/antex-infra/documents 
 77 0.360 0.097 0.200 2.150 2.150 0.390 
/projects/antex-infra/issues 152 1.070 0.230 0.830 6.030 6.920 0.920 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new 
{GET} 169 1.000 0.150 0.400 8.550 10.900 1.700 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new 
{POST} 80 1.230 0.330 0.960 4.990 4.990 0.870 
/projects/settings/antex-infra 77 0.570 0.120 0.380 4.710 4.710 0.650 
/projects/show/antex-infra 152 0.480 0.093 0.220 5.310 5.780 0.860 
/search/index/antex-infra 74 0.420 0.110 0.320 2.580 2.580 0.420 
Table 11: Response Time with Modsecurity 
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The next table presents the metrics when both naxsi and modsecurity are in place.  
 
 Page Total  Avg. Min. Median 99% Max. Std. Dev. 
https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com/ 90 3.300 0.042 0.190 17.200 17.200 5.360 
/attachments/432/Report_August.pdf 65 1.000 0.055 0.110 5.620 5.620 1.660 
/issues/show/1219 153 5.250 0.930 4.330 15.000 18.300 3.590 
/login {POST} 88 2.210 - - 22.200 22.200 5.030 
/my/page 73 0.500 0.150 0.260 4.170 4.170 0.630 
/projects 73 0.510 0.120 0.230 7.660 7.660 1.020 
/projects/activity/antex-infra 76 3.260 0.700 3.170 8.680 8.680 1.820 
/projects/antex-infra/documents 76 0.610 0.120 0.280 4.400 4.400 0.840 
/projects/antex-infra/issues 147 1.520 0.260 1.060 6.650 7.570 1.410 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new 
{GET} 161 1.350 0.180 0.520 8.380 11.400 1.890 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new 
{POST} 78 1.440 0.410 1.170 7.010 7.010 1.080 
/projects/settings/antex-infra 76 0.950 0.140 0.600 5.480 5.480 1.090 
/projects/show/antex-infra 149 0.600 0.110 0.300 4.490 6.310 0.910 
/search/index/antex-infra 65 0.720 0.140 0.500 4.920 4.920 0.760 
Table 12: Response Time with Naxsi and Modsecurity 
 
The next table depicts the results obtained the architecture with one load balancer, 
two naxsi nodes, and two modsecurity nodes.  
 
 Page Total  Avg. Min. Median 99% Max. Std. Dev. 
https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com/ 100 1.540 0.041 0.160 4.410 12.500 2.750 
/attachments/432/Report_August.pdf 75 0.680 0.046 0.140 2.040 5.550 1.100 
/issues/show/1219 173 4.420 0.460 3.590 8.560 15.700 3.180 
/login {POST} 98 1.350 - - 6.050 22.500 3.650 
/my/page 75 0.670 0.130 0.290 1.010 7.230 1.290 
/projects 75 0.550 0.089 0.220 0.900 7.180 1.110 
/projects/activity/antex-infra 81 0.470 0.150 0.350 0.810 1.770 0.330 
/projects/antex-infra/documents 80 0.270 0.097 0.220 0.460 1.650 0.210 
/projects/antex-infra/issues 155 1.030 0.230 0.730 1.860 7.750 1.190 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new {GET} 178 0.920 0.140 0.370 1.610 10.900 1.720 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new {POST} 81 1.600 0.460 1.140 3.720 5.180 1.210 
/projects/settings/antex-infra 80 0.410 0.120 0.320 0.840 2.110 0.330 
/projects/show/antex-infra 156 0.390 0.095 0.210 0.640 3.940 0.590 
/search/index/antex-infra 75 0.630 0.120 0.450 1.320 4.580 0.650 
Table 13: Response Times with the Architecture proposed 
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Kindly, the results for the scenario where the system is under attack are depicted 
below. 
 
 Page Total  Avg. Min. Median 99% Max. Std. Dev. 
https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com/ 94 2.010 0.043 0.310 7.590 7.590 2.530 
/attachments/432/Report_August.pdf 69 1.170 0.057 0.340 11.500 11.500 2.040 
/issues/show/1219 151 6.600 0.920 5.970 16.800 17.200 3.450 
/login {POST} 86 2.390 - - 27.400 27.400 5.260 
/my/page 75 1.070 0.150 0.510 5.430 5.430 1.300 
/projects 75 0.950 0.096 0.350 6.210 6.210 1.420 
/projects/activity/antex-infra 75 1.440 0.330 1.420 3.220 3.220 0.820 
/projects/antex-infra/documents 75 0.600 0.110 0.320 5.980 5.980 0.830 
/projects/antex-infra/issues 147 1.740 0.270 1.280 7.870 10.200 1.630 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new {GET} 157 1.800 0.160 0.810 10.800 16.800 2.510 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new {POST} 77 2.860 0.500 2.040 11.800 11.800 2.490 
/projects/settings/antex-infra 75 0.870 0.150 0.480 7.690 7.690 1.090 
/projects/show/antex-infra 148 0.780 0.120 0.400 6.880 7.420 1.160 
/search/index/antex-infra 69 1.120 0.170 0.560 9.930 9.930 1.550 
Table 14: Response Times with the Architecture proposed under Attack 
For comparison purpose, the table below aggregates the average response time for 
No WAF, naxsi (N), modsecurity (M), naxsi and modsecurity in sequence (N+M), testbed 
and testbed under attack. 
 
 Average page response time 
Page No WAF N M N + M 
 
 
Testbed 
Testbed 
under 
Attack 
https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com/ 1.930 2.470 2.230 3.300 1.540 2.010 
/attachments/432/Report_August.pdf 0.410 0.420 0.590 1.000 0.680 1.170 
/issues/show/1219 3.970 4.880 4.480 5.250 4.420 6.600 
/login {POST} 1.260 1.180 1.780 2.210 1.350 2.390 
/my/page 0.720 0.440 0.470 0.500 0.670 1.070 
/projects 0.260 0.410 0.280 0.510 0.550 0.950 
/projects/activity/antex-infra 0.560 1.880 3.200 3.260 0.470 1.440 
/projects/antex-infra/documents 0.120 0.240 0.360 0.610 0.270 0.600 
/projects/antex-infra/issues 0.760 1.010 1.070 1.520 1.030 1.740 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new {GET} 0.840 0.980 1.000 1.350 0.920 1.800 
/projects/antex-infra/issues/new {POST} 0.940 1.050 1.230 1.440 1.600 2.860 
/projects/settings/antex-infra 0.210 0.490 0.570 0.950 0.410 0.870 
/projects/show/antex-infra 0.250 0.450 0.480 0.600 0.390 0.780 
/search/index/antex-infra 0.390 0.570 0.420 0.720 0.630 1.120 
Table 15: Average Response Time Comparison 
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The table confirms that any architecture using WAF introduce some delay in the 
access to redmine pages. It should be noted that these results were conducted with caching 
disabled. We follow the recommendations from VirtualBox bug report regarding caching 
files by nginx and apache [36]. Apache and Nginx use mmap() for fast access to static 
content. Probably this mechanism needs a special support of the underlying file system 
which vboxvfs does not provide. 
Running the tests with cache enabled would contribute to an improved 
performance because some operations are delivered to the WAFs. However, this would 
introduce a bias in the experiments as they were built to precisely evaluate WAF's 
performance.  
The results evidence two anomalies with the average response time of a login page 
(/login {POST}) and of a web page running a database query (/my/page) being 
consistently lower when naxsi and modsecurity are used. The results were observed 
repeatedly in the multiple experiments performed to identify the reason, although the root 
cause was not found. 
A side-by-side comparison of Naxsi and Modsecurity shows no clear winner, with 
each of the WAFs presenting an improved performance on some of the web pages tested. 
Relevant for this study is the comparison of the composition of both WAFs with and 
without a load balancer, which evidence that the introduction of the later can absorb the 
negative performance penalty of the former by equally distributing the load by the two 
WAF circuits defined. 
Below is represented the average response time in graphical mode. It shows that 
some operations such as “show issues for specific project” take considerable time in all 
scenarios. 
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Figure 13: Average Response Time Graphic 
 
The standard deviation of the response time metric, depicted in Figure 14 clearly 
shows that the request type is the most influencing factor in the predictability of the 
response time. The exception is the Naxsi+Modsecurity composition when the load 
balancer is not used which consistently presents an above average standard deviation. 
 
 
Figure 14: Standard Deviation Graphic 
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4.1 Stability and reliability and usability 
A comparison of the functional and usability characteristics of both naxsi and 
modsecurity shows that naxsi does not rely upon pre-defined signatures, so it should be 
capable of defeating complex, unknown, obfuscated attack patterns. Naxsi by default 
reads a small subset of simple (and readable) rules containing known patterns involved 
in website vulnerabilities. For example, <, | or drop expression are not supposed to be part 
of a URI. This approach is very efficient, but very prone to false positives as well. 
However, it comes with a helpful tool (nxtool) to assist the “learning” process and which 
facilitates the identification of false positives and the definition of rules avoid them. This 
phase is important to avoid the risk of locking out legitimate users from the application. 
In terms of usability, the rules are very simple and easy to understand. 
Modsecurity also generates many false-positive results, as these rules are standard 
and not application-friendly. It is necessary to edit the default rules in order to eliminate 
the false positive results. Alternatively, it is possible to create a whitelist rules according 
to the application’s requirement, something that it was not required in the scope of this 
work. The rule creation is complex but can be extended or changed as needed. 
Modsecurity uses the popular Perl Compatible Regular Expressions (PCRE) library for 
pattern matching which with the advantage of being available for several operating 
systems. 
The creation of whitelists should be handled with care to avoid the opening of 
windows of exploitation for an adversary. Unfortunately, this requires particular caution 
and a permanent monitoring of the logs. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Future Work 
The traditional firewall architectures improve availability by using redundant nodes 
with the exact same characteristics and configurations. One of their main benefits is to 
facilitate the systems administration activities. This strategy is equally beneficial from an 
economic perspective as it reduces the training investment, which becomes constrained 
to one technology.  
However, redundancy does not contribute to improving security. Instead, systems 
should be heterogeneous as diversification enables the servers to be more resilient to 
attacks because the probability of using the same exploit to compromise diverse systems 
is lower. 
This work investigated the contribution of a combination of two popular open 
source WAF, naxsi and modsecurity to protect a web infrastructure. Both WAFs have the 
ability to understand the application level content.  
The naxsi and modsecurity differ in the following: learning mode, buffering and 
virtual patching. Using both WAFs in the architecture, we can take advantage of all the 
features available.  
The security test results show that the combination of naxsi and modsecurity offer 
a better protection against OWASP ZAP and customized tests. This fact is a great 
advantage against high skilled adversaries. They combine multiple attack methodologies 
and tools in order to reach and compromise their target. 
Even thought our solution ensures a more secure environment, the WAF´s affects 
the web service performance. This fact is a drawback of increasing the level of security. 
As expected, our proposed architecture adds extra overhead to the response time of the 
requests due to extra addition request processing. However, the results showed that the 
user experience could still be considered acceptable. 
Further work may focus on improving the security of the proposed solution by 
implementing the rejuvenation principle and a combination of dynamic application 
security testing (DAST). The rejuvenation implies that the nodes are periodically restored 
to the last corrected known image. The architecture and technology used in this 
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architecture facilitate the implementation of this concept. A virtual machine can be easily 
restored from a snapshot and the redundant node ensure the service continuity while the 
other node is rejuvenated. 
The DAST is a process of security testing an application or software product in a running 
state. A DAST scanner (Burp, OWASP Zed Attack Proxy) generates a report that serves 
as an input for WAF signatures. 
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Appendix A 
 
Whitelist 
BasicRule wl:1005 "mz:$HEADERS_VAR:cookie"; 
BasicRule wl:1010 "mz:$HEADERS_VAR:cookie"; 
BasicRule wl:1011 "mz:$HEADERS_VAR:cookie"; 
BasicRule wl:1315 "mz:$HEADERS_VAR:cookie"; 
BasicRule wl:1315 "mz:BODY"; 
BasicRule l:1315 "mz:$BODY_VAR:back_url"; 
BasicRule wl:1315 "mz:$URL_X:/login|$BODY_VAR:back_url"; 
BasicRule wl:2 "mz:$URL:/issues|BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:2 "mz:BODY"; 
BasicRule l:2 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:1101 "mz:$URL_X:/login|$ARGS_VAR:back_url"; 
BasicRule wl:1101 "mz:$URL_X:/login|ARGS"; 
BasicRule wl:1316 "mz:$URL_X:/account|$ARGS_VAR:mail"; 
BasicRule wl:1316 "mz:$URL_X:/account|ARGS"; 
BasicRule wl:1007 "mz:$BODY_VAR:issue[due_date]"; 
BasicRule wl:1007 "mz:$BODY_VAR:issue[start_date]"; 
BasicRule wl:1007 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|$BODY_VAR:issue[start_date]"; 
BasicRule wl:1007 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|BODY"; 
BasicRulewl:1007 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|$BODY_VAR:issue[due_date]"; 
BasicRule wl:1007 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|$BODY_VAR:issue[due_date]"; 
BasicRule wl:1007 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|$BODY_VAR:issue[start_date]"; 
BasicRule l:1007 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|$BODY_VAR:time_entry[comments]"; 
BasicRule wl:1007 "mz:$BODY_VAR:time_entry[comments]"; 
BasicRule wl:1007 "mz:BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:1310 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|BODY|NAME"; 
BasicRule l:1311 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|BODY|NAME"; 
BasicRule wl:1311 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|$BODY_VAR:notes"; 
BasicRule wl:1311 "mz:BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:1311 "mz:$URL_X:/issues|BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:1311 "mz:$BODY_VAR:notes"; 
BasicRule wl:1000 
"mz:$URL_X:/issues/edit|$BODY_VAR:issue[description]"; 
BasicRule wl:1000 "mz:BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:1000 "mz:$URL_X:/issues/edit|BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:1000 "mz:$BODY_VAR:issue[description]"; 
BasicRule wl:1015 
"mz:$URL_X:/issues/edit|$BODY_VAR:issue[description]"; 
BasicRule wl:1015 "mz:BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:1015 "mz:$URL_X:/issues/edit|BODY"; 
BasicRule wl:1015 "mz:$BODY_VAR:issue[description]"; 
BasicRule wl:1310 "mz:$URL_X:/users/edit|BODY|NAME"; 
BasicRule wl:1311 "mz:$URL_X:/users/edit|BODY|NAME"; 
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Appendix B 
 
CFRF Code 
<html> 
<body> 
    <form method=POST action="https://moldtrack.ai-emea.com/users/add"> 
       <input style="display: none" type="text" value="adversary" 
size="25" name="user[login]" id="user_login"/> 
       <input style="display: none" type="text" value="adversary" 
size="30" name="user[firstname]" id="user_firstname"/> 
       <input style="display: none" type="text" value="adversary" 
size="30" name="user[lastname]" id="user_lastname"/> 
       <input style="display: none" type="text" value="adversary@ai-
emea.com" size="30" name="user[mail]" id="user_mail"/> 
       <input style="display: none" type="password" size="25" 
name="password" id="password" value="adversary" /> 
       <input style="display: none" type="password" size="25" 
name="password_confirmation" id="password_confirmation" 
value="adversary" /> 
       <input style="display: none" type="checkbox" value="1" 
name="user[admin]" id="user_admin"/> 
       <input style="display: none" type="hidden" value="1" 
name="user[admin]"/> 
       <input style="display: none" type="submit" value="Create" 
id="commit" name="commit" /> 
  </form> 
  <script>document.getElementById("commit").click();</script> 
</body> 
</html> 
 
